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Contemporary surveillance is constant, pervasive, and invasive.1 Indeed, “if 
you figure that your life is so disorganized, private, and fragmented that no 
biographer would or could keep track of it, think again—your biography is 
being written as you read these pages.”2 Commentators warn of diminished 
possibilities for self-realization. “Psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, 
novelists, and technologists have all written about the effects of constant 
surveillance, or even just the perception of constant surveillance . . . 
Surveillance strips us of our dignity. It threatens our very selves as 
individuals.”3 Commentators identify two threats: one to social subgroups; 
the other, to society as a whole. We agree with both claims, but our concern 
is primarily with the second.  
There are two versions of that claim: a claim about a future loss of self-
realization, and a claim about a current loss. The “future loss” claim 
extrapolates from the numerous examples of the destructive effect 
surveillance currently has on a variety of social subgroups. You can predict 
a future society-wide loss if you add the following claim: history 
demonstrates that “the tendency of surveillance systems to . . . expand—to 
cover more people and more of the lives of the people they cover.”4 This 
provides ample reason to worry about a future loss of self-realization. 
Historical analogies lead to the same conclusion. There are compelling 
cases in which society-wide surveillance has led to a significant society-
wide reduction in self-realization.5 Society-wide surveillance in the United 
States is not now as repressive as it was in the historical examples, but add 
that surveillance tends to become increasingly repressive, 6  and there is 
                                       
1 The literature is vast. See, e.g., David Lyon, Surveillance After Snowden 
(2015). and Julia Angwin, Dragnet nation: a quest for privacy, security, and 
freedom in a world of relentless surveillance (2014). We review various 
aspects of the literature in Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, The Self, the 
Stasi, and the NSA: Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the 
Surveillance State, 17 Minn. J. Law Sci. Technol. 347 (2016), and Richard 
Warner & Robert H. Sloan, I’ll See: How Surveillance Undermines Privacy 
by Eroding Trust, 32 Santa Clara Comput. High Technol. Law J. 221 
(2016). 
2  John Gilliom & Torin Monahan, SuperVision: An Introduction to the 
Surveillance Society 43 (2012). 
3 Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your 
Data and Control Your World 127 (2015). 
4 James B. Rule, Privacy in Peril: How We Are Sacrificing a Fundamental 
Right in Exchange for Security and Convenience 151 (2007). 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 13–16. 
6 Christian Parenti, The Soft Cage: Surveillance in America From Slavery 
to the War on Terror (2004). 




again reason to worry about the future.  
Is there also reason to worry that surveillance is currently causing a serious 
society-wide loss of self-realization? Many commentators think so. They 
contend that the self withers in the searing light of surveillance,7 or that 
what survives is not the true self but a fabricated one,8 or that the self 
transforms into something else entirely—“mere algorithm fodder,”9 “nodes 
of information production,” 10  a puppet manipulated through “invisible 
threads,”11 or something less than human.12 These are not claims about the 
                                       
7  Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an 
Anxious Age (2005).  
8 The seminal source of this claim is Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison 217 (Alan Sheridan tran., 1995) (explaining that it is 
“not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, 
altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully 
fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies”). 
Many have taken up Foucault’s claim. See, e.g., David Lyon: surveillance 
“‘makes up’ the data double, our online persona, and that entity then acts 
back on those with whom the data are associated, informing us who we are, 
what we should desire or hope for, including whom we should become.” 
Lyon, supra note 1.   
9  Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That 
Control Money and Information 198 (2015). 
10 Ronald J. Deibert, Black Code: inside the battle for cyberspace 63 (2011) 
(noting that “we no longer move about our lives as self-contained beings, 
but as nodes of information production in a dense network of digital 
relations involving other nodes of information production”). 
11 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Cancer Ward 208 (2003). The full quote is:  
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, 
each containing a number of questions . . . There are thus hundreds of little 
threads radiating from every man, millions of threads in all . . . They are not 
visible . . . but every man is constantly aware of their existence . . . Each 
man, permanently aware of his own invisible threads, naturally develops a 
respect for the people who manipulate the threads. 
Bruce Schneier applied the passage to contemporary surveillance. BRUCE 
SCHNEIER: THE VALUE OF PRIVACY THE WASHINGTON NOTE BY STEVEN 
CLEMONS THE WASHINGTON NOTE (2006), 
http://washingtonnote.com/bruce_schneier_1/.  
12 Thus, Jean Baudrillard presciently in 1983:  
We are constantly confronted with the anticipated statistical verification of 
our behavior, and absorbed by this permanent refraction of our least 
movements, we are no longer confronted with our own will. We are no 
longer even alienated . . . Each individual is forced despite himself or 
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effect of surveillance on particular subgroups. They are claims about the 
current effect of surveillance on the self in any social setting.  
In support, commentators offer detailed and insightful pictures of the point 
with which we began: contemporary surveillance is constant, pervasive, and 
invasive. But that is all they offer. They do not explain why constant, 
pervasive, and invasive surveillance has the current, society-wide effect 
they claim. Their evidence typically consists primarily of examples of 
subgroups currently suffering a surveillance-induced loss of self-realization. 
They may also cite historical examples of highly repressive, society-wide 
surveillance. But, as we noted earlier, the most this evidence suggests is 
that surveillance may pose a threat of a future society-wide loss of self-
realization. In addition, there are many examples that support the claim that 
surveillance, far from threatening the self, is essential to adequate self-
realization. Public health is a good example. Ensuring adequate public 
health promotes healthy individuals, and being healthy typically facilitates 
self-realization. Surveillance is an essential means to these ends. Public 
health officials record details of disease and treatment, often in ways that 
allow personal identification. The information   
has provided the foundation for planning, intervention, and disease 
prevention and has been critical for epidemiological research into patterns 
of morbidity and mortality for a wide variety of diseases and conditions. 
Registries have been essential for tracking individuals and their conditions 
over time. Surveillance has also served to trigger the imposition of public 
health control measures, such as contact tracing, mandatory treatment, and 
quarantine.13 
 
Commentators debate both the appropriate type and acceptable extent of 
public health surveillance,14 but few would deny that some appropriately 
constrained surveillance is justified to promote health. So it is difficult to 
                                                                                         
herself into the undivided coherency of statistics. There is in this a positive 
absorption into the transparency of computers, which is something worse 
than alienation.   
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRITINGS 210 
(Mark Poster ed., Jacques Mourrain tran., 2nd ed. 2002).  
13 AMY L. FAIRCHILD ET AL., SEARCHING EYES: PRIVACY, THE STATE, AND 
DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 204 (2007). For concern about the 
sharing of health information, see, e.g., Lori Andrews et al., Privacy 
Policies of Android Diabetes Apps and Sharing of Health Information, 315 
JAMA: THE J. OF THE AM. MEDICAL ASS’N 1051 (2016), and Lori 
Andrews, Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues in Genetic Testing for Complex 
Genetic Diseases, VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (2003). 
14 See generally FAIRCHILD ET AL., supra note 13. 




see how appropriately constrained surveillance poses a threat to the self.15  
 In general, appropriately constrained surveillance often arguably 
facilitates self-realization. Analysis of large data sets, for example, can 
reveal patterns that would otherwise go unnoticed, and this has already 
yielded an astonishing array of benefits ranging from detecting drug 
interactions to improving access to social services in India by creating 
digital IDs for citizens. 16  It is difficult to see in such cases why 
appropriately constrained surveillance would not promote self-realization.  
 So are the commentators wrong to see surveillance as currently 
reducing opportunities for self-realization? We think not. Surveillance does 
create a present, society-wide threat. It does so by undermining a form of 
privacy we will call relational privacy. Relational privacy consists of 
people voluntarily limiting their knowledge of each other as they interact in 
a wide variety of social and commercial roles.17 The group coordination 
ensures group—and hence “relational”—control over the selective flow of 
information. 18  Adequate self-realization requires an adequate degree of 
coordination-enabled control. Surveillance undermines that control. The 
key to seeing how this happens across society as a whole lies in seeing how 
group coordination depends on a special form of knowledge—common 
knowledge, “the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows X, A 
knows that B knows X, B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum.”19 People 
                                       
15 Id. 
16 See RICK SMOLAN & JENNIFER ERWITT, THE HUMAN FACE OF BIG DATA 
72 (2012). 
17 The nineteenth century sociologist Georg Simmel was among the first to 
call attention to relational privacy. He observed that people voluntarily limit 
their knowledge of each other as they interact in a wide variety of social 
and commercial roles. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret 
Societies, 11 AM. J. SOCIOL. 441, 468 (1906). 
18 The connection between privacy and the self is a standard theme in the 
privacy literature. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 
112 (2008) (“Theorists have proclaimed the value of privacy to be 
protecting intimacy, friendship, individuality, human relationships, 
autonomy, freedom, self-development, creativity, independence, 
imagination, counterculture, eccentricity, thought, democracy, reputation, 
and psychological well-being”). 
19  Kyle A. Thomas et al., The Psychology of Coordination and Common 
Knowledge, 107 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 657, 657 (2014). They note that 
“Coordination may be achieved with the weaker notion of common belief, in which 
two agents each believe that a proposition is likely to be true with probability at 
least p, each believes that the other believes it with probability at least p, and so on 
. . . In the rest of this article, we will use the term common knowledge broadly, to 
6 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY  [Vol. XI No. 1] 
 
succeed in coordinating their efforts at voluntary restraint because they 
know they will coordinate appropriately, they know they know, know they 
know they know, and so on. When surveillance undermines such 
knowledge it strikes at relational privacy’s foundation and thereby threatens 
self-realization.   
 Our appeal to common knowledge is hardly surprising. As Thomas 
Kyle et al. observe in their groundbreaking study, The Psychology of 
Common Knowledge, “much of social life is affected by common-
knowledge generators,” 20  and they note, with regard to coordination in 
particular, “[a]ctors coordinate when they have evidence for common 
knowledge, and refrain from coordinating when they do not.”21 However, 
while our appeal to common knowledge may not be surprising, it is 
certainly unusual. Indeed, in the privacy literature appeals to common 
knowledge are, as far we have been able to determine, virtually nonexistent. 
The lack of attention to common knowledge in the privacy literature is of a 
piece with a general tendency to overlook common knowledge. 22  As 
Thomas et al. note, given the importance of common knowledge, it is 
“surprising that the psychology of common knowledge has apparently had 
so little visibility either in psychology or in everyday life.”23 They urge that 
“an acknowledgement of the role of common knowledge in enabling 
coordination can unify and explain a variety of seemingly unrelated and 
puzzling phenomena.”24 Our discussion of the role of common knowledge 
in relational privacy contributes to the broader task of adequately 
acknowledging the place of common knowledge in coordination generally.  
 Section I characterizes relational privacy and explains its role in 
self-realization. The group coordination that creates relational privacy 
depends on conformity to informational norms. Section II introduces 
informational norms and explains their role in coordination and in particular 
how coordination depends on common knowledge. While it is clear that 
common knowledge exists, it is far less clear how it arises. Section III 
shows how it arises and then explains how surveillance can undermine the 
processes that create and maintain common knowledge. Surveillance may 
but need not cause common knowledge to collapse, and that collapse may, 
but need not lead people to abandon coordination under informational 
                                                                                         
include ‘sufficiently high common p-belief’.” Id. at 658. We adopt the same usage.  
20 Thomas et al., supra note 19 at 671. 
21 Id. at 671. 
22 Id. at 659 (noting that “despite the fact that common knowledge is fundamentally 
a psychological phenomenon, little is known about the psychology of common 
knowledge”). 
23 Id. at 671. 
24 Id.  




norms. Section IV briefly considers the three possibilities: common 
knowledge and coordination persist; common knowledge collapses but 
coordination continues; and, common knowledge and coordination 
collapse. Section V concludes with a plea for further study of the role of 
common knowledge in relational privacy.  
 
I.  RELATIONAL PRIVACY 
Relational privacy is a variety of informational privacy. Informational 
privacy is the ability to determine for yourself when others may collect and 
how they may use your information.25 Informational privacy is relational 
when control over the flow of information is exercised collectively by a 
group, not unilaterally by individuals. The family holiday dinner is a good 
example. The family members have the goal of a harmonious dinner and 
long run harmonious relations, and they realize that that requires the 
selective disclosure of information. They know, for example, that there are 
things you can say to Aunt Jane that you cannot say to Uncle John and vice 
versa. No family member can unilaterally realize the goal of harmonious 
family relations. That requires group control. All members must observe the 
relevant strictures on the flow of information. Similar remarks hold for a 
wide range of examples. Pharmacists, restaurant customers and waiters, and 
students and teachers in large universities, for instance, typically share the 
goal of maintaining appropriately impersonal relationships, and to realize 
that goal, they typically exchange only the information necessary to their 
interaction in those roles and voluntarily refrain from requesting, 
disclosing, or otherwise discovering more.26 Waiters do not try to find out if 
you are married to your dinner partner, nor, if they know, announce that 
your dinner partner is not your spouse. Your pharmacist does not ask if you 
are happy in your marriage when you pick up your Xanax, although your 
internist may before prescribing it.  
As the examples illustrate, the specific patterns of informational restraint 
depend on the social roles in which people interact. There are many similar 
examples. Our concern here, however, is not with specific instances but 
with the general pattern that the instances all instantiate. A clear view of the 
general pattern is necessary to see how surveillance threatens the self.  
 
                                       
25 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (1967) See also James B. Rule, Privacy in Peril: How We 
Are Sacrificing a Fundamental Right in Exchange for Security and Convenience 3 (2007) 
(defining privacy “as the exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on oneself”). 
26 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash. Law Rev. 119, 120–121 (2004) 
See also; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context:  Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social 
Life (2010); Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 Dedalus 32 
(2011); Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information 
Technology, 7 Ethics Behav. 207 (1997). 
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A. The Characteristic Pattern 
 There are four parts to the pattern. Students and teachers in large 
universities are a good example.  
 (1) Shared goal. University students and teachers share a goal: 
teachers should assign grades only on the basis of relevant academic 
work. 27  Accepting this goal and seeking to realize it is part of what 
constitutes properly realizing both the teacher and the student roles. 
 (2) Need to control appearance. To achieve the goal, teachers must 
minimize bias, and that requires that students appear to teachers primarily 
in light of their relevant academic achievements, not in light of 
extracurricular aspects of their personalities, past academic records, honors, 
or punishments.28  
 (3) Need for cooperation. How you appear to someone depends on 
what they think about you. You cannot, for example, appear to be a diligent 
student to someone who thinks you are lazy. The individual efforts at 
selective disclosure of a single teacher or student will not be sufficient to 
ensure that students appear appropriately to that teacher. Teachers—enough 
of them—must limit what they tell other teachers and the university about 
the students they know, and students—enough of them—must limit what 
they reveal about themselves and about other students.    
 (4) Cooperation is routine. Students and teachers do cooperate—
routinely so. They do so even though often all the interacting parties know 
about each other is that one presents himself or herself in the role of a 
teacher, and the other in the role of a student.  
 The role-based interactions that give rise to relational privacy 
exhibit this four-part pattern.29 To summarize: There is (1) a goal whose 
realization requires (2) controlling appearance in (3) ways that no one act 
can unilaterally achieve and (4) the requisite control comes from others 
cooperating to selectively limit the disclosure, use, and distribution of 
information. The result is an intricate web of interaction in social roles that 
facilitates self-realization. 
 
                                       
27 Our evidence is mostly anecdotal. Students and teachers we have asked acknowledge the norm. 
See Yan Shvartzshnaider et al., Learning Privacy Expectations by Crowdsourcing Contextual 
Informational Norms, THE FOURTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN COMPUTATION AND 
CROWDSOURCING (HCOMP 2016) (2016), http://yansh.github.io/papers/HCOMP/ (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2016). 
28 Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power: Is It All Over?, 17 TUL. J. 
TECHNOL. INTELLECT. PROP. 61 (2014). Sloan and Warner, supra note 1. 
29  We analyze a number of examples in ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER, 
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS:  THE CRISIS IN ONLINE PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY (2013). 
Warner and Sloan, supra note 28. Sloan and Warner, supra note 1. 




B. The Self 
 We assume the following, widely shared ideal of self-realization: 
Each person should “work out for herself, in the light of her own 
experience, a specific picture of the best and most praiseworthy way of life 
which is accessible to her and which, more than any other, engages her 
imagination and her emotions.”30 Realizing this ideal requires privacy. One 
reason is, as the philosopher Thomas Nagel puts it, “the importance of 
concealment as a condition of civilization.”31 He explains that  
Concealment includes not only secrecy and deception but also reticence and 
non-acknowledgment. There is much more going on inside us all the time 
than we are willing to express, and civilization would be impossible if we 
could all read each other's minds. Apart from everything else there is the 
sheer chaotic, tropical luxuriance of the inner life. To quote Simmel: "All 
we communicate to another individual by means of words or perhaps in 
another fashion—even the most subjective, impulsive, intimate matters—is 
a selection from that psychological-real whole whose absolutely exact 
report (absolutely exact in terms of content and sequence) would drive 
everybody into the insane asylum." As children we have to learn gradually 
not only to express what we feel but also to keep many thoughts and 
feelings to ourselves in order to maintain relations with other people on an 
even keel. We also have to learn, especially in adolescence, not to be 
overwhelmed by a consciousness of other people's awareness of and 
reaction to ourselves—so that our inner lives can be carried on under the 
protection of an exposed public self over which we have enough control to 
be able to identify with it, at least in part.32  
 
As Nagel rightly emphasizes, inner lives need the “protection of an exposed 
public self.”33  
 The need for that protection is, however, just one side of the 
privacy coin. The flip side is the role of the “exposed public self” in 
facilitating self-realization. As the sociologist Nippert-Eng emphasizes:   
At its core, managing privacy is about managing relationships between the 
self and others . . . privacy . . . [is] a "boundary regulatory process by which 
a person (or group) makes himself more or less accessible and open to 
                                       
30 STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (Reprint ed. 1991). The ideal is part of 
classical liberal political philosophy. Noam Chomsky, who endorses the ideal, locates himself in 
this regard in the classical liberal tradition of John Stuart Mill. He notes that Mill, in his epigraph 
to On Liberty, states “the grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in 
these pages directly converges: the absolute and essential importance of human development in its 
richest diversity.” NOAM CHOMSKY, WHAT KIND OF CREATURES ARE WE? 60 (2015). 
31 THOMAS NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE: AND OTHER ESSAYS 4 (2002). 
32 Id. at 4 (quoting Simmel from KURT H. WOLFF, ED. THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 
(1950), pp. 311-12; translated from GEORG SIMMEL, SOZIOLOGIE (1908)).  
33 Id. 
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others." When we regulate our accessibility to others . . . we simultaneously 
regulate our relationships with them.34  
 
The public self manages the “boundary regulatory process,” not only to 
protect the inner life, but also to facilitate a variety of different types of 
relationships. Self-realization comes not just from the flourishing of the 
enclosed garden of the inner self, but from the pursuits of the public self as 
it interacts with others in a variety of social roles.35 You realize yourself as 
much through being a lawyer, doctor, racecar driver, chess player, 
birdwatcher, and so on, as you do through your soliloquies and intimate 
conversations.  
 
An Obvious Threat? 
 The threat to the self may now seem obvious. Contemporary 
surveillance is constant, pervasive, and invasive, and neither individuals nor 
groups have much power to prevent or constrain it. Surely that has to 
undermine the group control that is the hallmark of relational privacy? We 
think it does, but that is far from obvious. At first sight, reflection on 
examples suggests the opposite is true.  
 Consider the family dinner. The relational privacy goal is familial 
harmony, and the family members achieve that goal though their 
coordinated adherence to patterns of selective disclosure. Surveillance need 
not change that. It is possible for everyone to adhere to the same patterns of 
selective disclosure that they would in the absence of surveillance. The 
following contrast makes that clear. Suppose surveillance does disrupt 
familial harmony. Suppose Aunt Jane and Uncle John recently separated 
after years of marriage. Everyone, including Jane, knows John now has a 
much younger girlfriend, but everyone carefully avoids mentioning it. 
During dinner, however, thirteen-year-old, mischievous Tom posts a picture 
of the girlfriend on Facebook with the comment, “At least he didn’t bring 
her.” When Jane’s phone notifies her of Tom’s post, she shows the picture 
to everyone at dinner. The family members take sides, and the quarrels 
begin. Tom violated the recently instituted “Don’t mention John’s 
girlfriend” norm. To avoid such disruptions, the family members simply 
have to adhere to the family’s informational norms in their online activities. 
Surveillance may still intrude—if, for example, the FBI arrives to arrest 
Uncle John for the money laundering they detected from surveillance of his 
bank accounts, but putting such eventualities aside, it is difficult to see how 
surveillance disrupts relational privacy in a family.   
                                       
34 Christena E. Nippert-Eng, Islands of Privacy 22 (2010). 
35 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (1986); Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man 
(Reissue ed. 1992); David Rosen & Aaron Santesso, The Watchman in Pieces: Surveillance, 
Literature, and Liberal Personhood (2013); Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (1972). 




 A similar point holds for surveillance in education. Schools can be 
more or less restrained in their use of surveillance. They need not monitor 
student/teacher interactions aggressively or at all. Jenzabar, for example, 
offers to help schools “[e]xtract institutional data, analyze it, and view your 
business performance with an unprecedented array of reporting options.”36 
What data a school extracts and how it uses it is up to the school. 
Sufficiently invasive surveillance will undermine student/teacher relational 
privacy, but it is hard to see why appropriately constrained surveillance 
would do so—both in the school case and in general. Or does this overlook 
some hidden threat present even in appropriately constrained surveillance? 
We think it does.  
 To see why, we need a deeper look at relational privacy. The key is 
to see that relational privacy arises from conformity to informational norms. 
Informational norms are social norms that constrain the collection, use, and 
distribution of information.   
 
II.  INFORMATIONAL NORMS 
 Informational norms constrain the collection, use, and distribution 
of information. As Helen Nissenbaum notes,  
[Informational] norms circumscribe the type or nature of information about 
various individuals that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or 
even demanded to be revealed. In medical contexts, it is appropriate to 
share details of our physical condition or, more specifically, the patient 
shares information about his or her physical condition with the physician 
but not vice versa; among friends we may pour over romantic 
entanglements (our own and those of others); to the bank or our creditors, 
we reveal financial information; with our professors, we discuss our own 
grades; at work, it is appropriate to discuss work-related goals and the 
details and quality of performance.37  
 
Take teachers and students, for example. The behavioral pattern we noted 
earlier is the norm: teachers and students voluntarily refrain from sharing 
information in ways that ensure that students are evaluated primarily in the 
light of relevant academic achievements.  
 
A. Coordination Norms 
 How do norms explain the coordination that creates relational 
                                       
36 Cognos Analytics for Jenzabar JX, JENZABAR, https://www.jenzabar.com/cognos-analytics-for-
jenzabar-jx/ (last visited Oct 22, 2016). 
37 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. LAW REV. 119, 137–38 (2004). 
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privacy? In the same way that a norm explains driving on the right. 
Everyone wants to drive on the same side of the road as everyone else. 
Safety and convenience dictate that. In the United States and other “right 
side” countries, everyone knows that everyone drives on the right. So 
everyone drives on the right. How do people know that everyone drives on 
the right? Because the norm is to conform.38 Driving on the right is a classic 
example of a coordination norm. The example illustrates key features of 
such norms. (1) There is a shared goal—in this case driving on the same 
side. (2) No one can unilaterally achieve that goal; it requires the others’ 
cooperation. (3) To achieve the goal, everyone conforms to the norm—
because, but only as long as, everyone else does. If you expected everyone 
to drive on the left, you would too. In general, a coordination norm is a 
behavioral regularity in a group, where the regularity exists at least in part 
because (almost) everyone thinks that, in order to realize a shared interest, 
she ought to conform to the regularity, as long as everyone else does.39 
 Informational norms are (often but not always 40 ) coordination 
norms. The student/teacher norm is a good example. The shared goal is that 
teachers should evaluate students primarily on the basis of their relevant 
academic performances. Realizing this goal requires the across the board 
cooperation of students and teachers, so teachers and students conform to 
the norm—because, but only as long as, everyone else does.  
 There are many similar examples. 41  People routinely coordinate 
with each other to ensure the selective disclosure of information. Indeed, 
they often do so with complete strangers. How does that happen? There are 
two parts to the explanation. The first is that parties know they will 
conform. Call this first-level knowledge. The second part of the explanation 
is that the parties also have higher levels of knowledge. They have the 
common knowledge that they will conform. People have common 
knowledge that they will conform if they know they will conform, know 
they know it, know they know they know it, and so on. We explain the 
contribution to coordination of first-level knowledge and common 
                                       
38 Some will object that since it is the law that one drive on the right there is no need to appeal a 
norm. But that overlooks the cost of enforcement. As Elinor Ostrom notes, “If individuals 
voluntarily participate in a situation, they must share some general sense that most of the rules 
governing the situation are appropriate. Otherwise, the cost of enforcement within voluntary 
activities becomes high enough that it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain predictability in 
an ongoing voluntary activity.” ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 
21 (2005). We note also that there are driving norms that are inconsistent with laws—e.g., driving 
3-10 mph over the speed limit on US Interstates.  
39 See ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS:  THE CRISIS IN ONLINE 
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY 56-59 (2013). 
40 “Make your comments relevant” is an informational norm but not a coordination norm. You 
would adhere to the relevant comment norm even if most others did not. 
41 We have analyzed a number of other examples elsewhere in SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 
11. 




knowledge. In the next section, we explain how common knowledge arises.  
 
B. Coordination and Knowledge 
 An example is helpful. Imagine a freshman student, Roger, walks 
into his professor’s, Sarah’s, office during her office hours. Roger would 
like to confess that, “I am anxious all the time and feel terrified in class, 
afraid you will call on me. I grew up in a very small town where I was the 
smartest kid around. Now there is so much competition.” However, Roger 
is concerned about his privacy, and he will disclose how he feels only if he 
knows (1) that Sarah will conform to the student/teacher norm, and (2) that 
her conforming will be sufficient to ensure the norm-required selective 
disclosure of the information he reveals. Condition (2) is necessary because 
the point of coordination under relational privacy norms is to ensure the 
appropriate selective disclosure of information, so people will conform to 
those norms only if they know that others will conform and thereby ensure 
selective disclosure.  
 
1. First-level knowledge 
 Coordination requires first-level knowledge. Two things must be 
true for Roger to disclose his feelings. He must know that (1) Sarah will 
conform to the norm, and (2) her conforming will ensure norm-consistent 
information processing. The same is true for Sarah in regard to Roger.  
 We first explain how they know that they will conform. They know 
that because of a process of education and acculturation they have both 
undergone. That process makes a person’s presentation of themselves in the 
role of a student or teacher a basis for knowledge: education and 
acculturation result in everyone knowing that (typically) anyone who 
presents himself or herself conforms to the student/teacher norm. So when 
Roger and Sarah present themselves in their respective roles, each can infer 
that the other will conform. This is simply an instance of the general fact 
that, when people interact in social roles (not just the student/teacher roles), 
education and acculturation typically result in people who are potential 
performers of roles knowing that the others with whom they interact will 
conform to relevant informational norms. This in turn is an instance of the 
general fact about social roles that the sociologists Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann emphasize in their foundational work, The Social 
Construction of Reality: 
In the common stock of knowledge there are standards of role performance 
that are accessible to all members of a society, or at least to those who are 
potential performers of the roles in question. This general accessibility is 
itself part of the same stock of knowledge; not only are the standards of role 
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X generally known, but it is known that these standards are known. 
Consequently every putative actor of role X can be held responsible for 
abiding by the standards, which can be taught as part of the institutional 
tradition and used to verify the credentials of all performers and, by the 
same token, serve as controls.42 
 
 Now, how do Roger and Sarah infer that their conformity will 
ensure only norm-consistent information disclosure? To see how, consider 
that when parties interact under informational norms, third parties do not—
surveillance aside—have access to the information unless the norm allows 
it, or one of the parties violates the norm. We consider the effect of 
surveillance in the next section. The point is that, surveillance aside; people 
interacting under informational norms have excellent reason to think that 
norm-consistent behavior ensures only norm-consistent information 
disclosures.  
 
2. The Contribution of Common Knowledge 
 Coordination does not require common knowledge,43 but common 
knowledge nonetheless is important because it greatly facilitates 
coordination. The way to see why is to consider two types of cases: those in 
which first-level knowledge is not sufficient to ensure coordination, and 
those in which higher order—but finite—knowledge is insufficient. In 
describing the latter especially, it helps to add subscripts to “know” to keep 
track of levels of knowledge. By “higher order but finite” we mean 
knowledge that falls short of common knowledge. Common knowledge is 
infinite: the parties know1, know2 they know1, know3 they know2 they 
know1, and so on ad infinitum. Finite higher order knowledge stops at some 
point. The parties only know1, and they know all the iterations up to known, 
. . . know1, and their knowledge stops there.  
 First-level knowledge without high order knowledge. Assume first-
level knowledge exists. That is, Roger knows1 that Sarah will conform, and 
that her conformity will ensure only norm-consistent information 
disclosures. The same is true for Sarah in regard to Roger. Focus first on 
Roger. Even though Roger knows1 that Sarah will conform, he may not 
know2 that Sarah knows1 that he will conform. Imagine that, if someone 
were to ask Roger whether he knew that, he would reply, “I am not sure. I 
am a first-semester freshman from Adair, Illinois, population 210, and I 
look like it. So she may think I will not adhere to the norm because I do not 
know1 it.” Roger worries that Sarah will not follow the norm because she 
                                       
42 Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge 73 (1967). 
43 See infra section V, B. 




thinks he will not, and, beset with doubts, Roger does not confess and so 
fails in that way to coordinate under the norm with Sarah.   
 It is easy to imagine the same for Sarah. Suppose, were she asked if 
Roger knew1 she would conform to the norm, she would reply, “I am not 
sure. I was just making an impassioned plea in class last week for 
informational transparency. Given the questions Roger asked me in class, 
he may think I will rebel against the restrictions of the student/teacher 
norm.” Sarah worries that Roger will not follow the norm because he thinks 
she will not, and, beset with doubts, Sarah does not disclose her own small 
town past.  
 So should we add a second-level knowledge requirement to the 
explanation of coordination? But then the same problem arises at the third-
level of knowledge. Suppose that Roger knows2 that Sarah knows1 that 
Roger will conform, and suppose Sarah knows2 the same about Roger. But 
suppose also that Roger does not know3 that Sarah knows2 that Roger 
knows1 she will conform. Instead, he thinks, “I know2 that Sarah knows1 
that I will conform, but she does not realize I know2 that. She may think I 
think she is a devotee of informational transparency.” So Roger hesitates to 
make his confession. Similarly for Sarah, she thinks, “I know2 that Roger 
knows1 that I will conform, but he does not realize I know2 that. He may 
think I think he is a norm-ignorant freshman from a small town.” In 
general, consider any knowledge-level n at which Sarah knowsn that . . . 
knows1 that Roger will conform, and Roger knowsn that . . . knows1 that 
Sarah will conform. With enough ingenuity one can construct examples in 
which coordination fails because one of them fails to known+1 . . . that the 
other knows1 that he or she will conform. 
 Common knowledge eliminates these “higher order mismatch” 
possibilities. It makes the parties transparent to each other. Everything is 
out in the open, so there is no possibility of misunderstanding, 
misinterpretation, doubt, or deception at any knowledge level. As Thomas 
et al. note:   
common knowledge has a privileged role to play in facilitating 
coordination, in part because it avoids a second-order coordination problem 
. . . people [do not need to] decide how many levels of shared knowledge is 
enough to attempt coordination: How can individuals be certain that 
everyone requires the same number of levels of shared knowledge to 
attempt risky coordination? . . . [C]ommon knowledge provides the most 
effective and reliable path to coordination.44 
 
The benefit of common knowledge is clear, and it is also clear that people 
can have common knowledge. What is far less clear is how common 
                                       
44 Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 659. 
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knowledge arises. We turn to that issue in the next section.  
 Before we do so, it may seem we have overlooked a possibility. 
Can Roger fail to coordinate because he fails to know2 that Sarah knows1 
that their conformity will ensure norm-consistent information disclosure? 
The answer is no—as long as you put aside surveillance. Roger knows1 
Sarah will conform, and Roger also knows1 that in the absence of 
surveillance Sarah’s conforming means third parties will not have access to 
the information. On reflection, he will realize that that is obvious to Sarah 
too, so he can conclude Sarah knows1 that norm-conformity means only 
norm-consistent information disclosures.  
 
III.  HOW COMMON KNOWLEDGE ARISES 
We first characterize the type of situation that generates common 
knowledge, and then we use that characterization to show how surveillance 
can undermine common knowledge. We begin with an example. The game 
theorist Michal Chwe notes that, during a baseball game in 1996,  
baseball fans at Cleveland’s Jacobs Field [looked] up to see an airplane 
pulling a banner advertising anonymous HIV testing. Obviously the irony 
here is the airing of such a sensitive issue as AIDS publicly and even 
festively on a bright sunny day at the ballpark . . . [The underlying purpose 
is that] I would be more likely to get an HIV test if I knew that doing so 
was not unusual, but I wouldn’t find this out through everyday 
conversation; at the ballpark, looking up at the plane, however, it is obvious 
to all that everyone is seeing the same thing.45 
 
Thus, for everyone, seeing the sign was sufficient for knowing that 
anonymous HIV testing was available, and—because it was “obvious to all 
that everyone is seeing the same thing”—seeing the sign was sufficient for 
each person seeing it to know that everyone saw it, at least everyone who 
was paying minimal attention to what was happening above the stadium. 
These two features made it common knowledge among the “paying 
minimal attention” group that anonymous HIV testing was available.  
The common knowledge arose from two factors: (1) Almost everyone 
knows that the banner is flying over the stadium, and (2) almost everyone 
knows that almost everyone knows that.46 Of course, flying banners over 
                                       
45 Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge 
41 (2013). 
46 Peter Vanderschraaf & Giacomo Sillari, Common Knowledge, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2014 ed. 2014), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/common-knowledge/ (last visited Jul 1, 2015) 
(“[T]he basic idea . .  . is that for a set of agents, if a proposition A is publicly known among them 
and each agent knows that everyone can draw the same conclusion p from A that she can, then 
p is common knowledge.”) See also Stephen Schiffer, Meaning 32-35 (1973) (Schiffer calls 




stadiums is not the only way to create situations in which “it is obvious to 
all that everyone is seeing [learning, apprehending] the same thing.” 
Education and acculturation also routinely provide a basis for common 
knowledge in the same way.47 In the United States, for example, a process 
of explicit and implicit instruction, discussion, and correction makes it 
obvious to everyone—at least those with a minimum of basic education—
that everyone learns that George Washington was the first president of the 
United States. Thus, not only is it true that (1) almost everyone in the 
United States learns that George Washington was the first president; it is 
also true that (2) almost everyone knows that almost everyone learns that.  
Social roles and associated informational norms generate common 
knowledge in this way. Consider the student/teacher norm. In the 
appropriate group (which includes at least students and teachers at large 
universities), education and acculturation result in everyone knowing that 
students and teachers conform to the student/teacher norm, and in everyone 
knowing that everyone knows that everyone is subject to that process of 
education and acculturation. So, not only do students and teachers know 
that students and teachers adhere to the student/teacher norm, they all know 
that they know that. The result is common knowledge of conformity to the 
norm. In general, the situations that generate common knowledge of X 
among group G meet two conditions: (1) there is a process which results in 
all members of G knowing X, and (2) the process ensures that all members 
of G know that all members of G undergo the process and as a result come 
to know X.  
 
IV.  HOW COMMON KNOWLEDGE CAN COLLAPSE 
Surveillance can cause common knowledge to collapse. We emphasize that 
we are not claiming that surveillance inevitably leads to the collapse of 
common knowledge. Surveillance can, but need not, cause social roles to 
lose their ability to generate relevant common knowledge. Moreover, when 
it does cause common knowledge to collapse, it can, but need not, stop 
people from coordinating under informational norms. The next section 
examines each possibility: common knowledge and norm-enabled 
coordination persist; common knowledge collapses but norm-enabled 
coordination persists; and, common knowledge and coordination collapse. 
In this section we provide the background essential to considering these 
possibilities: the explanation of how surveillance can lead to the collapse of 
common knowledge. Our explanation assumes that people know that they 
are under surveillance and know relevant details about it. This may seem 
                                                                                         
common knowledge “mutual knowledge”). We give our explanation of how common knowledge 
arises from the situations described in the text in Warner and Sloan, supra note 1.  
47 Talcott Parsons, The Social System Ch. 6 (2012). 
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unwarranted. While knowledge of the general existence of surveillance may 
be widespread, knowledge of its current pervasiveness and invasiveness is 
not. We assume, plausibly we contend, that this lack of knowledge is 
temporary.48 
It is convenient to continue with the educational surveillance example. 
Suppose that, as Roger and Sarah know, their university has recently 
adopted Jenzabar, a student information system. There are two cases to 
consider. In the first, Roger and Sarah fail (at some level) to know that the 
other will conform. In the second, they fail to know that their conformity 
ensures norm-consistent information processing.  
 
A. Lack of Knowledge of Each Other’s Conformity 
In one example of the first case, Sarah participates in aggregating “each 
student’s information from disparate academic and administrative systems 
across your campus to create . . . a 360 degree view of each student.”49 
Among other things, she uses the online final grade submission process. For 
each student, the online form has an “Additional Comments” box. If Sarah 
chooses to do so when she thinks it is relevant, she could insert overall 
impressions of students such as “struggled with divorce and single 
parenting this semester,” “smart but unmotivated,” and so on. Now imagine 
that Roger visits Sarah in her office. He wonders if he should confess his 
feeling anxious and terrified. There are two scenarios to distinguish: first-
level failures to know, and higher order failures to know.  
 First level failures to know. Suppose that, if Roger discloses his 
anxiety, Sarah will convey that information to the administration. Suppose 
also that Roger realizes that, and that he regards her conveying information 
as a violation of the student/teacher norm. Will Roger confess? Almost 
certainly not. Common knowledge fails at the first level: Roger does not 
know1 that Sarah will conform. Indeed, there is a failure before we reach 
any levels of common knowledge: Sarah will not, in fact, conform. 
 Higher order failures. Consider a case in which Roger and Sarah 
both know1 that the other will conform. Suppose also that, if Roger 
discloses his anxiety, Sarah will not convey that information to the 
                                       
48 Post-Snowden, knowledge of government surveillance is widespread. According to a 2013 
PEW survey, “50% of Americans answered ‘a lot’ to ‘How much, if anything, have you heard 
about the government collecting information about telephone calls, e-mails and other online 
communications as part of efforts to monitor terrorist activity?’ Another 37% answered ‘a little.’ 
See PEW Research Center for the People & the Press July 2013 Political Survey, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER FOR PEOPLE & THE PRESS (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
questionnaires/7-26-13 NSA Topline for Release.pdf. Totaling the percentages yields 87% with 
some knowledge of government surveillance. 
49  JENZABAR RETENTION, http://www.jenzabar.com/sites/default/files/resource-
downloads/Jenzabar_Retention_Brochure_web_2.pdf. 




administration. Like Roger, she regards conveying information as a 
violation of the student/teacher norm, and she adheres to the norm. Suppose 
Roger knows this. Unbeknownst to Sarah, he overheard her passionately 
objecting to Jenzabar in a conversation with another faculty member. He 
heard Sarah say, “If a student tells me about emotional struggles with 
school, there is no way I am recording that on Jenzabar!” So, Roger knows1 
that Sarah will conform to the norm. To see how Sarah can know the same 
about Roger, suppose she is an adviser to the student newspaper. The day 
before Roger’s visit to her office, she reads his yet to be published op-ed 
piece inveighing against Jenzabar. The piece concludes, “Don’t let Jenzabar 
change us! Join me in adhering to the student/teacher norm as if Jenzabar 
did not exist. Speak truth to power!” So, Sarah knows1 that Roger will 
conform to the norm.  
 But, to focus first on Roger, he does not know2 that Sarah knows1 
that he will conform. An earlier op-ed in the student newspaper claimed 
that the faculty thought that the students were “members of the Facebook 
generation” who “mindlessly” disclose information without a thought about 
privacy. The op-ed cited “extensive recent surveys” in support of this claim. 
The surveys were a fiction, but students, including Roger, were in general 
agreement with the op-ed’s characterization of the faculty’s attitude. So 
when Roger asks, “Do I know2 that Sarah knows1 that I will conform?”, he 
answers “no”. Now consider Sarah. She does not know2 that Roger knows1 
that she will conform. Last week, in her Freshman Seminar, “Surveillance: 
Argus Panoptes For Us All?”, Roger, his anxiety bursting out in rage, went 
on a tirade in which he characterized the faculty as “spineless cogs in the 
university surveillance machine.” So, Sarah answers “no” to “Do I know2 
that Roger knows1 that I will conform?”  
 Here common knowledge fails at the second level, because of the 
potential for one of the principals to participate in surveillance. With 
enough ingenuity, you can construct third level failures, and indeed, in 
principle, failures for any level n.   
 
B. Lack of Knowledge of Norm-Consistent Information Disclosure  
Suppose Sarah does not participate in surveillance by transferring personal 
information about Roger. Assume that Roger knows1 that Sarah conforms 
to the norm, and likewise for what Sarah knows1 about Roger.  
Suppose that Sarah runs and participates in a class social media site, and 
that the university records and analyzes activity on such sites. There are 
first level and higher level cases of knowledge about whether norm 
conformity leads to norm-compliant information disclosure to distinguish.  
First level failures to know. Suppose Roger is considering disclosing his 
anxiety on the social media site. He will do so only if he can answer two 
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questions affirmatively. First, “Do I know1 that Sarah conforms to the 
student/teacher norm with regard to my social media postings?”, and 
second, “Do I know1 that her conformity ensures the appropriate selective 
disclosure of those postings?” Roger’s answer to the second question 
depends on what he believes about the university’s surveillance practices. 
Suppose he is convinced that the university collects and analyzes non-
anonymized information about students’ psychological attitudes, and 
suppose he regards their doing so as a violation of the student/teacher norm. 
So Roger answers no to the second question, and common knowledge fails 
at the first level.  
Higher order failures. Suppose the university’s information processing 
practices are a model of respect for relational privacy. The university 
anonymizes the information it collects, and it does its best to avoid 
collecting information that students or faculty might reasonably regard as 
sensitive. In particular, it does not collect psychological information 
students or faculty divulge on social media. Both Roger and Sarah know 
this, so they know1 not only that they will conform to the norm, but also 
that their conformity will ensure norm-consistent information processing. 
But suppose each thinks that the other is misinformed about the university’s 
practices and believes that the other thinks that the university collects non-
anonymized psychological information. Then each fails to know2 that the 
other knows1 that their conformity will ensure norm-consistent processing. 
As before, with enough ingenuity, it is possible (at least in principle) to 
describe knowledge failures at any level n. 
 The collapse of common knowledge is possible. But to what extent 
will this happen? We consider the three scenarios we distinguished earlier: 
common knowledge and norm-enabled coordination persist; common 
knowledge collapses but norm-enabled coordination persists; and, common 
knowledge and coordination collapse. Each scenario involves a current, 
society-wide threat to self-realization.  
 
V.   THREE SCENARIOS 
 We think some combination of these possibilities is most likely, but 
our goal here is simply to briefly sketch each possibility. We make several 
suggestions of people’s likely responses in each of the three scenarios. The 
suggestions, while plausible, cry out for empirical confirmation. That is part 
of the point. There is a clear need for further empirical study of the role of 
common knowledge in coordination.  
 
A. Common Knowledge and Coordination Persist 
 Surveillance and common knowledge are compatible. In the family 




dinner example, for instance, imagine family members frequently post 
information about family activities on social networking sites and thus 
expose activities to surveillance. It could still be true that that: (1) family 
discussions and interactions ensure that family members know that only 
things that can be said to all at the family dinner are to be posted to 
Facebook; and (2) the family members know that all family members learn 
that. That is enough to maintain common knowledge of conformity to the 
family informational norms.  
 Even with such peaceful co-existence, surveillance still poses a 
threat to self-realization. To see why, return to educational surveillance. 
Suppose a school uses a student information system to “store each student’s 
socio-economic status, demographic profile, academic history, and financial 
aid package.”50 The library uses technologies “to track material borrowing 
and capture what digital resources students access;”51 and, where students 
use electronic textbooks, the school captures reading habits.52 In addition, 
the school uses a single sign-on system “for campus applications and 
networks, [and so has] the capacity to store unique pieces of data, which are 
either input directly by the student or captured as students interact with a 
system.”53  
 Assume students and faculty are uncertain about whether and to 
what extent these activities are inconsistent with the student/teacher norm.54 
That makes them uncertain about the answers to “Will others conform to 
the student/teacher norm?” and “Will any such conformity be sufficient to 
ensure norm-consistent information processing?” Without clear affirmative 
answers, students and teachers will fail to achieve common knowledge. 
Given the critical role of relational privacy in self-realization, and given the 
role of common knowledge in relational privacy, it is reasonable to assume 
that students and teachers will seek to eliminate the uncertainty about what 
counts as conforming to the student/teacher norm. One way to eliminate the 
uncertainty would be to eliminate the school surveillance that gave rise to 
it. Assume that is not within the power of the students and faculty. It is, 
however, in their power to alter their conception of what counts as 
conformity to the norm. Imagine a process of concern, followed by 
toleration, and then acceptance. At the end, students and teachers 
unhesitatingly answer affirmatively to “Will others conform to the 
student/teacher norm?” and “Will any such conformity be sufficient to 
ensure norm-consistent information processing?”  
                                       
50 Alan Rubel & Kyle M. L. Jones, Student Privacy in Learning Analytics: An Information Ethics 




54 Indeterminacy in norms is common. We discuss several cases in Warner and Sloan, supra note 
29. 
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 It is certainly possible for such a process to lead to changes in 
informational norms that accommodate surveillance. The danger is that 
people will be too tolerant of surveillance and eventually embrace a world 
in which surveillance unduly restricts opportunities for self-realization. 
Twenty-first century society already takes surveillance practices in stride 
that would have been unthinkable in the mid-twentieth century. In his 1964 
best seller, The Naked Society, Vance Packard expressed “his horror that 
‘cabled TV’ will allow the “possibility of getting ‘an instantaneous readout’ 
home by home of what millions of people are [watching] in the entire 
country in about fifty seconds.”55 Now people hardly give that a second’s 
thought. It would be interesting and important to know the extent to which 
people are likely to adjust their norms to accommodate surveillance.  
 
B. Common Knowledge Collapses, Conformity Persists 
What happens when common knowledge does collapse? Do people stop 
conforming to informational norms as a result? Not necessarily. To see 
why, focus first on interactions among strangers, people whose relevant 
knowledge of each other consists primarily in the fact that they are 
interacting in certain roles. Role-based common knowledge makes 
strangers transparent to each other for purposes of role-based coordination. 
They become opaque when it disappears, and the task is to predict how they 
will act in surveillance contexts based solely on the fact that they present 
themselves in a certain role. Different people will react differently. For 
people you know well, you may be able to assign some rough probability to 
a prediction of what they will do, but, in the case of strangers, you will not 
have enough information to do that. All you will know is that different 
people will react differently, and you will be unable to assign any even 
rough probability to whether they will conform or not. You will be 
uncertain.56 
What people do when they are uncertain depends on how they value the 
relevant outcomes. 57  If they value conformity enough, they will still 
conform. Consider a non-norm example first. Suppose that Victor prefers to 
attend the opera if Victoria attends as well, and prefers to stay home alone 
if she does not. He is uncertain whether she will attend. Whether Victor will 
go to the opera depends on how much he values the options relative to each 
other. If he values going to the opera with Victoria highly enough, he will 
                                       
55 Vance Packard, The Naked Society 11 (Revised ed. 2014). 
56 This use of “uncertainty” is standard in economics. See KEN BINMORE, RATIONAL DECISIONS 
35 (2011). 
57 We offer a game-theoretic model in support of this claim in Robert H Sloan & Richard Warner, 
The Harm in Merely Knowing: Privacy, Complicity, Surveillance, and the Self, 19 J. INTERNET 
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go even though he is uncertain whether she will. Conformity under 
informational norms is the same. A person will conform if the person 
values the positive consequences of conformity sufficiently more than the 
negative consequences of non-conformity. So, if enough people value 
conformity highly enough, people may continue to coordinate under 
informational norms. The observable behavior will look the same as it does 
when common knowledge leads parties to coordinate. What is going on, 
however, is very different. People are not acting on knowledge. They are 
gambling—placing bets on uncertain outcomes.  
Assume, as before, that people will seek to eliminate the uncertainty, and 
assume a process that moves from concern through tolerance to acceptance 
of surveillance. As that process unfolds, people could modify existing 
informational norms or evolve new ones that embrace surveillance. 
Common knowledge would return as people were again able to answer 
affirmatively to the questions “Will others conform to norms?” and “Will 
such conformity be sufficient to ensure norm-consistent information 
processing?” The danger again is that revised and new norms greatly reduce 
relational privacy and hence reduce opportunities for self-realization. 
  
C. Coordination Collapses 
When common knowledge collapses, coordination will too, to the extent 
that people place a sufficiently large disvalue on surveillance. A sufficiently 
widespread collapse would be a disaster. Life under the East German Stasi 
is a plausible example. The “hidden, but for every citizen tangible 
omnipresence of the Stasi, damaged the very basic conditions for individual 
and societal creativity and development: Sense of one’s self, Trust, 
Spontaneity.” 58  A widespread collapse of coordination is obviously an 
outcome to avoid.  
 A plausible example of the collapse in the case of a single norm is 
the relationship between journalists investigating government wrongdoing 
and their confidential sources. The norm is that, exceptional circumstances 
aside, journalists protect the political independence of the press by not 
revealing their confidential sources. Widespread conformity to the norm 
matters because no single journalist can ensure a politically independent 
press. That takes a concerted effort of a critical mass of journalists. 
Conformity requires that journalists have common knowledge that they will 
conform and that their conformity will be sufficient to ensure an 
appropriately selective flow of information, a flow that protects the identity 
of their sources. Intensive and repressive surveillance of journalists under 
both the Bush and Obama administrations has greatly increased the risk 
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investigative journalists face. Protecting the identity of a source now often 
entails government harassment, a serious risk of imprisonment, and, in 
national security cases, the possible threat of prosecution under the 
Espionage Act.59  As New Yorker reporter Jane Mayer observed, “It’s a 
huge impediment to reporting, and so chilling isn’t quite strong enough, it’s 
more like freezing the whole process into a standstill.”60 So in this context, 
how will journalists answer these questions: “Will other journalist conform 
to the norm?” and “Will any such conformity be sufficient to ensure norm-
consistent information processing?” To the extent that journalists fail to 
answer affirmatively, common knowledge collapses.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The above discussion underscores the need for a better understanding how 
social roles generate common knowledge and how surveillance can 
undermine social roles’ power to do so. An adequate understanding is 
essential to an adequate response to the threat that constant, pervasive, 
invasive surveillance poses to relational privacy.  
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